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PROTECTING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST DISINFORMATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM FISA
JILL I. GOLDENZIEL∗ & MANAL CHEEMA∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting national security, especially in a time of crisis, can come at a
cost to Americans’ civil liberties. The U.S. government must make difficult
choices between implementing the strongest possible protections from foreign threats and preserving Americans’ constitutional freedoms at home. Irreparable violations to civil rights can and have occurred from striking the
wrong balance. 1 In a time of indefinite war against unconventional adversaries, the balance between protecting national security and preserving civil
liberties is of utmost importance.
As the new “endless war” shifts from the war on terror to the information domain, 2 Congress must enable the United States to fight enemy information warfare while protecting the rights to privacy and freedom of
speech and information. 3 Congress has had some recent experience crafting
legislation to balance national security with these constitutional rights: The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”). 4 FISA, initially passed in
© 2019 Jill I. Goldenziel & Manal Cheema.
∗ Associate Professor of International Law and International Relations, Marine Corps University-Command and Staff College; Affiliated Senior Scholar, University of Pennsylvania Fox Leadership International Program. Thanks to Mark Graber and Michael Pine. Errors are our own. Views
expressed in this Article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the position of the
Department of Defense or any other arm of the U.S. government.
∗∗ J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Virginia School of Law. I am thankful for the support
and encouragement of my family and friends. Errors are our own.
1. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435–36 (1943) (allowing Japanese
Americans to be detained because they did not vacate their homes after being excluded by executive
order).
2. President George W. Bush coined the term “War on Terror” shortly after September 11,
2001. Remarks on Arrival at the White House and an Exchange with Reporters, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1114–16 (Sept. 16, 2001). The term would come to be used to refer to U.S. military actions in Iraq
and Afghanistan and to fight terrorism all over the world. As of this writing, American military
presence in Iraq and Afghanistan is winding down. Focus has shifted to information warfare. For
example, the U.S. Marine Corps established information as a warfighting function in January 2019.
ROBERT B. NELLER, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, MARINE CORPS BULLETIN 5400 (Jan.
17, 2019), https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/MCBUL%205400.pdf?ver=2019-0206-082807-103.
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V and amend. IX (privacy); U.S. CONST. amend. I (free speech).
4. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
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1978, was modified significantly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. FISA provoked robust debate in the national security community, prompting several
amendments to its provisions, 5 specifically those contained in the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008 (“FAA”) 6 and the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017. 7
Lessons learned from debates over FISA can inform legislation that
would balance national security and First Amendment rights in the fight
against information warfare. FISA is an example of Congress’s attempt to
thread the same needle that any response to foreign disinformation campaigns
must: allowing surveillance of foreign agents without unduly infringing on
the First Amendment rights of U.S. persons (“USPERs”). This Essay will
argue that FISA can serve as a framework for balancing the government’s
need to access USPERs’ First Amendment-protected information to combat
information warfare with USPERs’ constitutional rights. 8
To preserve civil liberties, Congress must ensure that federal agencies
access USPERs’ First Amendment-protected information solely for narrowly
tailored national security purposes. 9 Congress should mandate that government agencies use only open-source data on USPERs whenever sufficient
open-source data is available and when time permits given the urgency of
any particular national security concern. 10 If an agency cannot meet those
two requirements without risking its goal(s), Congress should require the
agency to obtain a court order or warrant to conduct prospective surveillance
of USPERs’ communications. 11
FISA can serve as a framework for constitutional protections of U.S.
civil liberties in the context of fighting information warfare. To sanction
government surveillance under FISA, a judge must find probable cause that

5. See, e.g., Chris Inglis & Jeff Kosseff, In Defense of FAA Section 702: An Examination of
Its Justification, Operational Employment, and Legal Underpinnings, LAWFARE (Apr. 26, 2016,
7:31 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/defense-faa-section-702-examination-its-justification-operational-employment-and-legal-underpinnings (arguing in favor of § 702 of the FAA); Faiza Patel
& Elizabeth Goitein, Fixing the FISA Court by Fixing FISA: A Response to Carrie Cordero,
LAWFARE (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:18 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/fixing-fisa-court-fixing-fisa-response-carrie-cordero (arguing that “FISA became an existential threat to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement in ordinary criminal cases” when the FISC abandoned the “primary purpose
test”); Benjamin Wittes, Yeah, But Is It a Good Bill? Thoughts on the Leahy FISA Reform Proposal,
LAWFARE (July 30, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/yeah-it-good-bill-thoughts-leahy-fisa-reform-proposal (considering whether proposed Senate reforms were “worth pursuing”).
6. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436.
7. FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, 132 Stat. 3 (2018)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801) [hereinafter 2017 Amendments].
8. This Essay expands on our introduction of this argument in the article Jill I. Goldenziel &
Manal Cheema, The New Fighting Words?: How U.S. Law Hampers the Fight Against Information
Warfare, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 81, 136–37 (2019).
9. Id. at 48.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power and/or probable
cause that the target uses a particular facility. 12 The court cannot accept the
government’s assertion that someone is an agent of a foreign power based
solely on their First Amendment activities. 13 Instead, “a judge may consider
past activities of the target, as well as facts and circumstances relating to current or future activities of the target.” 14 However, under FISA Section 702, 15
when the government is surveilling foreign actors overseas, it may incidentally collect information about or communications of USPERs with
whom potential foreign targets communicate. 16
These First Amendment protections that FISA provides for USPERs can
be a useful model for legislation to enable the United States to combat information warfare, combined with additional safeguards suggested by FISA’s
critics. Specifically, to protect the First Amendment, Congress should require procedures similar to FISA’s when open-source information is unavailing. First, the government should obtain a court order or warrant under probable cause, based on something more than First Amendment activities.
Second, where the government incidentally collects the information of
USPERs, the government should adopt and follow minimization procedures
to prevent the misuse and retention of that data. Any legislation relaxing
surveillance restrictions on USPERs to combat information warfare should
also be subject to extensive oversight from the Department of Justice, Congress, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), similar to
the oversight program in place for FISA Section 702. 17
This Essay will proceed in the following parts. Part I will provide a
brief overview of the challenges of responding to disinformation campaigns.
Part II will provide background on the political and legal landscape that drove
the development of FISA. Part III will explain how electronic surveillance
orders are applied for and obtained under FISA and how FISA succeeds and
fails in providing protections for civil liberties in traditional surveillance and
Section 702 bulk data surveillance. Part IV then will discuss how a warrant
requirement is critical for protecting First and Fourth Amendment interests
in any surveillance operation. Finally, Part V will explain how lessons

12. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)–(b) (2012).
13. Id. § 1805(a)(2)(A); see United States v. Aziz, 228 F. Supp. 3d 363 (M.D. Pa. 2017); United
States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548–51 (E.D. Va. 2006) (finding a judge can rely in part on
these activities as long as there is probable cause that the target may be involved in unlawful clandestine activities).
14. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(b).
15. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
16. The FISA definition of a USPER is broader than just a U.S. citizen. Under § 1801(i), a
USPER is a citizen, a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”), an unincorporated association where a
substantial number of members are citizens or LPRs, and so on. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2012).
17. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
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learned from FISA should inform legislation designed to address disinformation campaigns meant to influence the electoral process.
A. The Challenge of Responding to Disinformation Campaigns
In 2016, Russian actors and other non-USPERs used the informational
and organizational capabilities of social media to influence the U.S. presidential election. According to the Intelligence Community Assessment of
Russian actions, Russia’s interference in the 2016 election was its “[b]oldest
[y]et,” aimed to “undermine public faith in the U[.]S[.] democratic process.” 18 Russia is attempting to influence the 2020 election 19 with similar
covert actions intended to “sow division in our society, undermine confidence in our democratic institutions, and otherwise affect political sentiment
and public discourse to achieve strategic geopolitical objectives.” 20
Russian information campaigns utilized paid advertisements, false stories, and divisive propaganda to carry out their goals. 21 As many as 126 million Facebook users, representing almost forty percent of the U.S. population,
were exposed to content promulgated by Russian actors. 22 Social media companies, regulatory agencies, Congress, and the general public continue to debate23 how to curtail foreign interference in the democratic process, preserve
the integrity of the political process, and retain critical civil liberties protections.
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy characterizes the United
States response to enemy information warfare as “tepid and fragmented.” 24
One reason is that U.S. laws and jurisprudence protecting free speech and
privacy do not reflect modern technological realities. First Amendment doctrine, the Privacy Act of 1974, and related laws hinder the U.S. response to
information campaigns. 25 In particular, the Privacy Act and other Cold War18. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT ’L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT:
ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS 1, 5 (2017),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.
19. Josh Gerstein, U.S. Brings First Charge for Meddling in 2018 Midterm Elections,
POLITICO (Oct. 19, 2018, 4:43 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/19/first-criminalcase-filed-over-russian-interference-in-2018-midterms-916787.
20. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CYBER DIGITAL TASK
FORCE 1 (July 2, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1076696/download; see also Goldenziel & Cheema, supra note 8, at 84.
21. Goldenziel & Cheema, supra note 8, at 87.
22. Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (2017) (prepared statement of Colin Stretch, General Counsel, Facebook).
23. Once Considered a Boon to Democracy, Social Media Have Started to Look Like Its Nemesis, ECONOMIST (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/11/04/once-considered-a-boon-to-democracy-social-media-have-started-to-look-like-its-nemesis.
24. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 35
(2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-20170905.pdf.
25. Goldenziel & Cheema, supra note 8, at 84.

118

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:114

era surveillance laws do not allow the collection of USPERs’ data that would
adequately enable the government to assess the extent of information campaigns and fight them.
Laws restricting collection on USPERs need to be relaxed, while still
maintaining appropriate safeguards for civil liberties, to allow the United
States to combat enemy information warfare effectively. 26 Preserving the
integrity of the electoral process is a national security interest that itself involves a First Amendment right. However, legislation must appropriately
balance this national security interest with other civil liberties concerns. 27
One mechanism for achieving this balance is reforming surveillance laws to
allow government agencies to surveil USPERs under a narrowly tailored national security exception with appropriate constitutional safeguards. 28 At the
same time, legislation must remain flexible enough to allow agencies to move
“quickly to fight rapid and constantly changing information threats.” 29
Lessons learned from FISA and its amendments, which represent the
last major attempt to reform surveillance laws for national security purposes,
are crucial to developing such legislation. We argue that new legislation
seeking to combat information warfare must exceed FISA’s protections for
constitutional liberties to preserve constitutional rights when allowing government surveillance of USPERs.
B. Why FISA Came to Be
Congress enacted FISA in the wake of abuses by the U.S. intelligence
community that threatened the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. Two
events provoked Congress to pass FISA in 1978:30 (1) the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. U.S. District Court (“Keith”), 31 and (2) the
Church Committee reports. 32 First, in Keith, the Supreme Court considered
Fourth Amendment requirements in domestic surveillance cases targeting an
internal threat. 33 “The Keith Court recognized the Executive’s power to obtain intelligence information through electronic surveillance . . . under the

26. Id. at 168.
27. Id. at 122.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 135.
30. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978).
31. 407 U.S. 297 (1972) [hereinafter Keith].
32. The U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, formed in 1975, was chaired by Idaho Senator Frank Church and became
known as the “Church Committee.” U.S. Senate Historical Office, Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2019). The
committee investigated intelligence abuses by the CIA, FBI, IRS, and other agencies. Id.
33. 407 U.S. at 309.
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Article II Oath Clause.” 34 However, due to the “convergence of First and
Fourth Amendment values,” 35 the Court found that “the Clause, alone, is
hardly sufficient to support warrantless surveillance merely on the basis of
the foreign origin of the threat.” 36 It also asserted that “Congress may wish
to consider protective standards for [domestic security surveillance] which
differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III.” 37 The
Keith decision encouraged the Executive and Congress “to find a legislative
solution to the problem of warrantless searches.” 38
Second, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the “Church Committee”) described
the domestic intelligence abuses by intelligence agencies and the military,
which the executive had rationalized merely as foreign intelligence gathering. 39 The Senate created the Committee in the aftermath of Watergate and
the disclosure of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (“CIA”) domestic and
covert operations. 40 Among other abuses, the Committee investigated the
CIA’s assassination plots, 41 plans by a White House associate counsel to increase intelligence-gathering on Vietnam War protestors and other dissidents, 42 covert operations in Angola and Chile, 43 President Nixon’s 1969
warrantless wiretapping of several journals and government employees, 44
and the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) SHAMROCK program. 45 In
considering these events, “[t]he Church Committee found that the [Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”)] internal security and domestic intelligence
programs compiled massive files on activities protected by the First Amendment and the political opinions of Americans.” 46 Between 1975 and 1976,

34. William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 74 (2000) (footnote omitted); see Keith, 407 U.S. at 310.
35. Keith, 407 U.S. at 313.
36. Banks & Bowman, supra note 34, at 74; see Keith, 407 U.S. at 319–20.
37. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322.
38. Banks & Bowman, supra note 34, at 75.
39. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. II, at 6–7 (1976).
40. Marc B. Langston, Rediscovering Congressional Intelligence Oversight: Is Another
Church Committee Possible Without Frank Church?, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 433, 436 (2015) (noting
specifically the 1974 reports by Seymour Hersh in The New York Times).
41. Id. at 458.
42. Id. at 461.
43. Id. at 463.
44. Id. at 464.
45. Id. at 466. The program involved various private companies providing the NSA with
Americans’ international telegrams from 1947 to 1975. Id. at 468.
46. 147 CONG. REC. 20,672 (2001); see also Langston, supra note 40, at 474 (describing FBI’s
2370 actions between 1956 and 1971 to harass dissidents within the United States and the FBI’s
plot to blackmail Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.).
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the Church Committee published fourteen reports on U.S. intelligence agencies and provided recommendations to address their abuses. 47 The reports
emphasized the absence of explicit congressional or judicial standards in the
field of surveillance. 48 The Church Committee’s disclosures shocked Americans, causing them to view their own government with new suspicion. 49
As a result of these findings, Congress passed FISA in 1978 to constrain
and impose judicial review on executive branch surveillance programs. 50
FISA legislation also created the FISC to review FISA applications, allowing
the government to obtain intelligence while still protecting privacy and individual rights. 51 FISA was meant to ensure that “electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence” comported with the Fourth Amendment. 52 The 1978
Senate Intelligence Report to FISA (“Senate Intelligence Report”) declared
that Congress did not intend FISA to permit surveillance of lawful activities
of American citizens, even those activities that are “secret and conducted for
a foreign power.” 53 The Senate Intelligence Report emphasized that individuals retain two freedoms. First, they must be free to communicate with “representatives of foreign governments or with foreign groups.” 54 Second, they
must be free from a chilling effect, that is, “free from any fear that such contact might be the basis for probable cause to believe they are acting at the
direction of a foreign power thus triggering the [g]overnment’s power to conduct electronic surveillance.” 55
This legislative history produced by the Senate Intelligence Report,
which is the most widely accepted interpretation of FISA, makes it clear that
legal protection extends only to the “lawful exercise of [F]irst [A]mendment

47. See Assassination Archives & Research Ctr., Church Committee Reports, http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm (last visited July 13, 2019) (providing links to all
fourteen reports).
48. Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First
Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 806–07
(1989) (describing the Church Committee’s investigation and finding that “warrantless electronic
surveillance had been used against United States citizens who were not readily identifiable as reasonable sources of foreign intelligence information”); see also Sharon H. Rackow, How the USA
Patriot Act Will Permit Governmental Infringement upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of
“Intelligence” Investigations, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1651, 1666 (2002).
49. Langston, supra note 40, at 474.
50. 147 CONG. REC. 20,673 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
51. Caitlin Thistle, Comment, A First Amendment Breach: The National Security Agency’s
Electronic Surveillance Program, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1197, 1201–02 (2008); see also ACLU
Found. of So. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1,
at 15 (1977)).
52. United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1311 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
53. S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 29 (1978).
54. Id.
55. Id.

2019]

PROTECTING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

121

rights of speech, petition, assembly, and association.” 56 The Senate Intelligence Report stated that electronic surveillance might be appropriate if there
is probable cause to believe that “foreign intelligence services [are] hid[ing]
behind the cover of some person or organization in order to influence American political events and deceive Americans into believing that the opinions
or influence are of domestic origin and initiative.” 57 The Senate Intelligence
Report predicted such deception would be “willfully maintained in violation
of the Foreign Agents Registration Act,” and could thus be prosecuted. 58
Thus, the Senate Intelligence Report contemplated that activities seeking to
undermine or “influence American political events,” such as elections, may
be subject to surveillance, even if they implicate traditional First Amendment
activities. 59
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF FISA
FISA authorizes four investigative activities: (1) electronic surveillance; 60 (2) physical searches; 61 (3) pen register and trap and trace surveillance; 62 and (4) business records. 63 This Essay focuses on electronic surveillance, as defined in Section 1801(f), which is the primary method for
surveillance to prevent and combat disinformation campaigns.

56. Id. (emphasis added). The 1978 Senate Judiciary Committee report and the House Intelligence Committee report on FISA seem to contradict the Senate Intelligence report. The Judiciary
Committee report states that activities protected by the First Amendment may not “form any part
of the basis” for identifying a FISA target. See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 23 (1977) (“In no event may
lawful political activity within the ambit of the protections afforded by the first amendment be the
basis, or form any part of the basis, for finding that any individual is engaged in ‘clandestine intelligence activities.’”). Likewise, the House Intelligence Committee Report emphasized that FISA
“would not authorize surveillance of ethnic Americans who lawfully gather political information
and perhaps even lawfully share it with the foreign government of their national origin.” See In re
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 739 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (emphasis added) (quoting H. REP. NO. 951283, at 40 (1978)).
57. S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 29 (1978).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–12 (2012); see id. § 1801(f)(1)–(4) (defining the four categories of
electronic surveillance under FISA).
61. Id. §§ 1821–29. Congress amended FISA in 1994 to authorize physical searches of the
“premises, property, information or material of a foreign power or agent of a foreign power” in the
United States, conducted for the purpose of collecting “foreign intelligence information.” Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, sec. 302(b), § 1882, 108 Stat.
3423, 3445 (1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1822 (2012)).
62. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1842–46.
63. Id. §§ 1861–62. In 1998, Congress amended FISA to permit FBI use of pen registers and
trap and trace devices and authorized FISA surveillance of business records. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, sec 402, § 1842, 112 Stat. 2396, 2405 (1998)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012)).
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A. Requesting and Obtaining Order
Section 1804(a)(1) through (9) describes the required contents of an application to conduct electronic surveillance under FISA. A federal officer
must apply for a court order from the FISC, in writing and under oath, which
must be approved by the Attorney General (“AG”). 64 The application must
identify or describe the specific target, and the AG must find that standard
investigation cannot reasonably obtain the information. 65 In a FISA application, a federal officer must: (1) provide statements of facts and circumstances
that justify the officer’s belief that the person is a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power; 66 (2) list the facilities or places that the target is allegedly
using; 67 and (3) describe the nature of the information and types of communication sought. 68
At a minimum, the application must allow the FISC to find probable
cause that the target is a “[f]oreign power” 69 or an “[a]gent of a foreign
power.” 70 The terms “[f]oreign power” and “[a]gent of a foreign power”

64. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 1804(a)(3)(A).
67. Id. § 1804(a)(3)(B).
68. Id. § 1804(a)(5).
69. Id. § 1801(a).
“Foreign power” means—
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the
United States;
....
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of [USPERs]; [or]
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments . . . .
Id.
70. Id. § 1801(b).
“Agent of a foreign power” means—
(1) any person other than a [USPER], who—
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power . . .
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence
activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States, when the
circumstances of such person’s presence in the United States indicate that such person
may engage in such activities in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids
or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any
person to engage in such activities; [or]
....
(2) any person who—
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of
a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power,
knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such
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ensure the international nexus necessary to fall under FISA’s jurisdiction.
Within the definition of “[a]gent of a foreign power,” there is a “knowingly”
requirement when a USPER is the proposed target, thereby heightening the
standard for finding that a USPER is an agent. 71 In other words, the government would have to prove that the USPER knowingly acted for or on behalf
of a foreign power, whereas the government would not need to make a showing of mens rea for a non-USPER.
To receive a FISA order, the government must have the “significant purpose” to obtain foreign intelligence information (“FII”) from the surveillance. 72 The definition of FII is broad, and the standard for FII collection
further depends on whether the information concerns a USPER. 73 FII is information that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against
actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts; 74 sabotage or international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 75 or clandestine intelligence activities by or of a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power. 76 On the one hand, if the information sought
does not concern a USPER, the information must only relate to these activities. 77 On the other hand, if the information involves a USPER, the information collected must be necessary to (a) the national defense or security of
the United States 78 or (b) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United
States. 79 Russian disinformation is likely to fall into the catch-all language
regarding security and foreign affairs. 80
Fundamentally, the “significant purpose” requirement protects against
abuse of FII collection. In other words, the “sole objective” in the collection

foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal
statutes of the United States; [or]
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in
preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; . . . .
Id.
71. Id.; see United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Section 1801(b), for
example, makes a [USPER] an agent of a foreign power only if he ‘knowingly’ engaged in certain
activities; the [S]ection contains no knowledge requirement with respect to non-[USPERs].”).
72. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B). The USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to state that acquisition of FII need only be a significant purpose, rather than the primary purpose, of the surveillance.
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, sec. 218, 115 Stat.
272, 291 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B) (2012)).
73. Id. § 1801(e).
74. Id. § 1801(e)(1)(A).
75. Id. § 1801(e)(1)(B).
76. Id. § 1801(e)(1)(C).
77. Id. § 1801(e)(1)–(2).
78. Id. § 1801(e)(2)(A).
79. Id. § 1801(e)(2)(B).
80. Id. § 1801(e)(2).
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of FII may not be “merely to gain evidence of past criminal conduct” to punish the agent of a foreign power. 81 FISA requires a high-ranking executive
branch official to certify that: (1) the information sought is FII; (2) a “significant purpose” of the surveillance or search is to obtain FII; and (3) normal
investigative techniques cannot reasonably obtain such information. 82
Membership in or activities in support of an organization—even one
that advocates violence—are protected First Amendment activities. 83 Under
FISA and the First Amendment, a proposed target’s mere association with
terrorist groups cannot justify surveillance. Instead, the government must
establish probable cause that a prospective target intentionally acted to further terrorist activities. 84
FISA’s high standards for the collection of information on USPERs can
serve as a model for creating legislation that would allow domestic surveillance of USPERs. Requiring an application for a court order from FISC, and
heightened requirements for collection on USPERs, would preserve constitutional rights. As discussed below, requiring a warrant would better protect
civil liberties. 85 However, a warrant requirement may not always be practical
in light of urgent national security concerns.
B. FISA’s Protections for Civil Liberties
Beyond certification, FISA places additional restrictions on surveillance
that seek to balance national security and First Amendment rights, namely,
minimization procedures and a prohibition on surveilling a USPER solely
based on First Amendment activities. In particular, FISA imposes limitations
on how non-public information regarding non-consenting USPERs may be
used, requires a FISC judge to review the adequacy of proposed minimization
procedures, and limits the use of First Amendment information of a proposed
target.
First, to reduce the risk that surveillance might interfere with the rights
of USPERs, FISA imposes limitations on the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of non-public information regarding non-consenting USPERs. 86
81. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). But to the extent that
obtaining FII is in part influenced by law enforcement interests, FII collection and criminal prosecution functions may overlap. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(e), 1804, 1823(e).
82. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6).
83. See United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (acknowledging
Senate report notes, which stated that the purpose of FISA was to strike a balance between the need
for surveillance and the protection of civil liberties), judgment aff’d without opinion, 729 F.2d 1444
(2d Cir. 1983) and judgment aff’d on other grounds, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
84. See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 23, 27–28, 47 (1977) (clarifying that the probable cause standard
is the same as in the traditional criminal context and that the Government must “establish[] probable
cause that each and every element of [the status of agent of a foreign power] exists”).
85. See infra Section II.D.
86. 50 U.S.C. § 1806 (allowing the use of information acquired from electronic surveillance
concerning USPERs where certain minimization procedures are followed, (e.g., notification to the
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Non-public information concerning a USPER may be disseminated without
that person’s consent only if the person’s “identity is necessary to understand
the [FII] or assess its importance.” 87 Specifically, the AG must promulgate
“minimization procedures” that are “reasonably designed” to minimize acquisition and retention and prohibit dissemination to avoid over-collection
and misuse. 88
Minimization procedures vary depending on the context: the type of intelligence collection at issue, the agencies involved, and the nature of the target. 89 For traditional FISA electronic surveillance, minimization occurs at
the retention and dissemination stages. 90 If information is neither FII nor
evidence of a crime, the reviewing agent will minimize information collection by discarding, erasing, or omitting the information in the indexing log. 91
And, before dissemination, the reviewing agent must redact all USPERs’
names and personal identifiers, except when “such person’s identity is necessary to understand [FII] or assess its importance” or is evidence of a
crime. 92
Minimization procedures for bulk data collections under Section 702 are
more stringent. 93 The procedures place limits on who may access Section
702-acquired information and on the use of “sensitive information,” such as
“religious[,] academic, political, or highly personal” information and medical
information. 94 For upstream collection, or collection of communications
from fiber cables and infrastructure, 95 the FISC imposes additional procedures, such as “restrict[ing] access to databases most likely to contain wholly
domestic communications,” requiring the information to be purged from the

aggrieved person, permitting motions to suppress, and requiring the destruction of unintentionally
acquired information, with exceptions)).
87. Id. § 1801(h)(2).
88. Id. § 1801(h)(1).
89. Emily Berman, Digital Searches, the Fourth Amendment, and the Magistrates’ Revolt, 68
EMORY L.J. 49, 72 (2018).
90. Id. at 73. Retention is where the information is decoded, translated, or otherwise made
readable. Id.
91. In re All Matters Submitted to FISA, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 618 (FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated
on other grounds by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
92. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(2), 1821(4)(B); In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 618.
93. Berman, supra note 89, at 75.
94. Id. at 76; see also LORETTA E. LYNCH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MINIMIZATION
PROCEDURES USED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IN CONNECTION WITH
ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 4 (2016),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/icotr/51117/2016_FBI_Section_702_Minimization_Procedures_Sep_26_2016_part_1_and_
part_2_merged.pdf (enumerating the limitations on the FBI’s acquisition of communications in line
with Section 702(b)).
95. James Bamford, They Know Much More Than You Think, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 15,
2013), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/08/15/nsa-they-know-much-more-you-think/.
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system, permanently tagging the information as “upstream” to alert its sensitive nature, and limiting retention to two years. 96
Second, a FISC judge must sign off on proposed minimization procedures and deem them consistent with the need to obtain, produce, and disseminate FII. 97 Every FISC order incorporates these minimization procedures. FISC may also require supplemental procedures in certain
circumstances, 98 and the government may request modifications to the procedures. 99 FISA also contemplates that minimization can occur later in the
process of reviewing the communications. 100
Third, and finally, the FISC cannot accept the government’s assertion
that a USPER is an agent of a foreign power “solely” based on activities protected by the First Amendment. 101 Instead, the judge “may consider past activities of the target, as well as facts and circumstances relating to current or
future activities of the target.” 102 However, if the government has probable
cause to believe the target may also be involved with or knowingly aiding or
abetting unlawful clandestine activities, the FISC may authorize surveillance
even if the target is engaged in First Amendment activities. 103 As a federal
district court ruled, a target’s involvement in protected First Amendment activities does not bar electronic surveillance under FISA. 104

96. Berman, supra note 89, at 76–77. For an explanation on how the NSA’s upstream collection program obtains wholly domestic communications and the FISC’s consideration of how NSA’s
targeting and minimizing procedures comport with the Fourth Amendment, see generally
[REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], 2011 WL 10945618, at *1, *15–17, *23–28 (FISA Ct.
Oct. 3, 2011) (discussing NSA’s targeting procedures and how NSA’s upstream collection program
collects wholly domestic communications, the minimization framework does not meet FISA, and
the minimization and targeting procedures do not satisfy the Fourth Amendment).
97. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (outlining required minimization procedures).
98. See, e.g., In re All Matters Submitted to FISA, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 618–19 (FISA Ct.
2002) (noting the legislative history that suggests a FISC judge has “discretionary power to modify
the order”).
99. Id. at 619 (describing how the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General “augmented” and “expanded” procedures governing contacts between FBI and Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) attorneys during FISA surveillance).
100. Inherent in the concept of retention, an agency can obtain raw FISA-acquired information
that needs to be evaluated for whether it contains FII, information necessary to understand or assess
FII, or evidence of a crime. See LYNCH, supra note 94, at 5. The FBI then conducts minimization
procedures, such as striking personal identifiers, from the raw FISA-acquired information. Id. at 9.
Raw FISA-acquired information, that is, information the FBI obtained but must still review, can
only be held for five years, unless the agency determines an extension is necessary. Id. at 22.
101. United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548 (E.D. Va. 2006) (explaining a judge can
rely in part on these activities as long as there is probable cause that the target may be involved in
unlawful clandestine activities).
102. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(b).
103. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. at 549–50.
104. Id.
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C. Court Orders and Section 702 Surveillance
Alongside the procedural and substantive requirements embedded in
FISA, the Fourth Amendment, specifically the warrant requirement, also protects USPERs from improper surveillance under FISA. If surveillance intentionally targets a USPER, even if they are reasonably believed to be abroad,
the traditional probable cause and warrant analyses are required. 105 However,
with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (“FAA”), Congress distinguished
procedures for targeting non-USPERs outside the United States, 106 collecting
FII inside the United States targeting USPERs outside the United States, 107
and collecting FII by targeting USPERs outside the United States. 108 The
enactment of the FAA affected how the probable cause and warrant analyses
would apply, if at all, to the three categories.
The FAA had two primary goals. First, “Congress wanted to provide a
sound statutory framework, consistent with the Constitution” that would enable the targeting of those abroad and, at the same time, afford additional
protections to USPERs “whose communications are targeted for collection
or collected incidentally.” 109 For example, the FAA prevents the government
from targeting USPERs overseas without an individualized warrant, as had
been possible before. 110 Second, Congress “wanted to provide civil immunity” for service providers who assisted the intelligence community. 111
The FAA preserves the principle of relying on the location of the potential target of surveillance and their USPER status as a basis for regulating
intelligence collection. But unlike the practice with traditional FISA applications, the FAA does not require the government to obtain a FISC order
identifying the facilities, telephone lines, e-mail addresses, places, or property where any surveillance will be directed. For programmatic surveillance,
the FAA eliminated the requirement for the government to show probable
cause that the target of surveillance was a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power.
Sections 702, 703, and 704 of the FAA cover collection on USPERs and
non-USPERs outside the United States. First, Section 702 provides procedures for targeting non-USPERs abroad. 112 The AG and the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) may authorize, for up to one year, targeting of
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

50 U.S.C. §§ 1881b(c)(1)(B), 1881c(c)(1)(B).
Id. § 1881a.
Id. § 1881b.
Id. § 1881c.
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ’S ACTIVITIES UNDER SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 14 (2012) [hereinafter OIG REPORT],
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/o1501.pdf.
110. Id. at 14–15.
111. Id. at 15.
112. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a.
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non-USPERs reasonably believed to be located outside the United States,
subject to approved targeting and minimization procedures. 113 Section 702
is limited to determining whether targeting and minimization procedures
comply with the statute and the Fourth Amendment. 114 It establishes a system with oversight for U.S. internet service providers to respond to government requests for information on foreign people believed to be located overseas and associated with foreign intelligence topics. Section 702 does not
permit the intelligence community to target a USPER anywhere in the
world 115 but permits incidental collection on USPERs, subject to minimization and use rules. 116
Next, Section 703 regulates collection inside the United States that targets USPERs outside the United States. 117 It applies when the assistance of
a provider is required to target the USPER. 118 Applications made to the FISC
must describe the techniques used, 119 but do not have to specify the targeted
facilities. 120 Additionally, a USPER overseas may be targeted under this Section if they meet the description of an agent of a foreign power in Title 50,
section 1801(b)(2) of the United States Code or if they are officers or employees of a foreign power. 121 Section 703 contains a seven-day emergency
provision. 122 Specifically, if an applicant can obtain an order under normal
circumstances, but “an emergency situation exists” that requires the acquisition of FII, the AG can authorize the acquisition if a judge is informed at the
time of authorization and an application is made to the FISC within seven
days. 123
Finally, Section 704 describes acquisitions targeting USPERs outside
the United States. 124 It provides for FISC jurisdiction over the targeting of

113. Id. § 1805(d)(1).
114. Id. § 1881a (among other subsections, subsection (b) provides limitations on acquisitions,
subsection (d) explains targeting procedures, subsection (e) provides minimization procedures, subsection (f) requires the Attorney General to adopt guidelines “consistent with the [F]ourth [A]mendment” and limits FBI access to certain communications, subsection (g) explains the Attorney General’s certification requirements, and subsections (h), (i), and (j) provide for judicial review).
115. Id. § 1881a(b)(3).
116. In re Directives [Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105b of FISA, 551 F.3d 1004, 1015 (FISA
Ct. Rev. 2008) (noting that “incidental collections occurring as a result of constitutionally permissible acquisitions do not render those acquisitions unlawful”).
117. 50 U.S.C. § 1881b.
118. Id. § 1881b(c)(5)(B).
119. Id. § 1881b(b)(1)(G).
120. Id. § 1881b(b)(1)(H).
121. Id. § 1881b(c)(1)(B)–(C).
122. Id. § 1881b(d)(1).
123. Id. § 1881b(d)(1)(A).
124. Id. § 1881c.
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USPERs reasonably believed to be located overseas when the collection occurs outside the United States. 125 Applications need not specify the techniques or targeted facilities. 126 A USPER overseas may be targeted under
this Section if they meet the description of an agent of a foreign power in
section 1801(b)(2) or if they are officers or employees of a foreign power. 127
Like Section 703, it contains a seven-day emergency provision. 128
FISA authority for electronic surveillance of USPERs may not exceed
ninety days. 129 The government must obtain approval from the FISC for an
additional authorization, not to exceed ninety days. 130 For non-USPERs, the
surveillance authority may be granted for up to 120 days and up to one year
upon renewal of the application if the FISC has probable cause to believe that
no communications of any individual USPER will be acquired during the
renewal period. 131 Renewals are unlimited so long as the government can
continue to show the FISC that the government has probable cause to believe
the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and the target
still uses or is about to use the targeted facilities. 132
The FAA represents improved protections for constitutional liberties
when conducting surveillance. With the Act, Congress made clear that
USPERs require additional protections that are not necessary for nonUSPERs and clarified other protections required for USPERs. In particular,
the seven-day emergency requirement in Sections 703 and 704 creates a balance between the flexibility needed to address urgent national security concerns with safeguards for constitutional rights.
D. Protections on Bulk Data Collection
The FAA and the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017
(“2017 Amendments”) also limit surveillance authorities, especially under
Section 702. FISA primarily structures limitations on surveillance around
what is known at the time of acquisition. 133 First, surveillance “may not intentionally target any person known . . . to be located in the United States.” 134
Second, surveillance “may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose . . . is to target

125. Id. § 1881c(a).
126. Id. § 1881c(b) (omitting mention of needing to specify techniques or targeted facilities in
the application).
127. Id. § 1881c(b)(3)(B).
128. Id. § 1881c(d)(1).
129. Id. § 1805(d)(1).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. § 1805(d)(2).
133. Id. § 1881a(b).
134. Id. § 1881a(b)(1).

130

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:114

a . . . person reasonably believed to be in the United States.” 135 Third, surveillance “may not intentionally target a [USPER] reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States.” 136 That said, under the 2017 Amendments, surveillance may target a person to gather foreign intelligence without
a separate FISC order if the AG has authorized “the emergency employment
of electronic surveillance or a physical search.” 137 Fourth, the surveillance
“may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender
and all intended recipients are known . . . to be located in the United
States.” 138 Finally, all surveillance must be “consistent with the [F]ourth
[A]mendment.” 139 In addition to these limitations, the FBI cannot access the
contents of Section 702-acquired communications without a court order. 140
To be precise, the FBI cannot retrieve information obtained “pursuant to a
query made using a [USPER] query term” if its query “was not designed to
find and extract [FII]” but instead is performed “in connection with a predicated criminal investigation” unrelated to national security. 141
The FBI and NSA are the only agencies authorized to acquire FII under
Section 702. 142 The FBI may only use USPERs’ information collected under
Section 702 as evidence in a criminal proceeding if the agency obtains a court
order or if the criminal proceeding involves one of the items on an enumerated list of conduct. 143 The FBI must also review the sufficiency of the
NSA’s explanation for its reasonable belief that the account’s user is outside
of the United States. 144 Finally, the FBI must review and evaluate the sufficiency of the NSA-provided information that the person to be targeted is a
non-USPER. 145
Although collections under Section 702 do not require warrants, Section
702 includes many protections for constitutional liberties. Congress clarifies
restrictions on collection on USPERs. The amendments to FISA also impose
important certification requirements for these modes of surveillance to protect constitutional liberties. 146 First, the AG and DNI must certify to the FISC
135. Id. § 1881a(b)(2).
136. Id. § 1881a(b)(3).
137. 2017 Amendments, supra note 7, at 132 Stat. 13. Under this emergency exception, the
Attorney General may authorize electronic surveillance where they “reasonably determine[]” that
surveillance is required “to obtain [FII] before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due
diligence can be obtained.” 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(1)(A).
138. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(4).
139. Id. § 1881a(b)(5).
140. 2017 Amendments, supra note 7, at sec. 101, 132 Stat. 4.
141. Id.
142. OIG REPORT, supra note 109, at xiii. For the CIA to participate, it must submit its targeting
request to the NSA. Id.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at xv.
146. 2017 Amendments, supra note 7137, at sec. 101, 132 Stat. 4.
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that acquisitions under the program will meet the targeting objectives and
limitations under section 1881a. 147 Second, they must certify that the acquisitions will satisfy traditional FISA minimization procedures. 148 Finally, the
certification must reflect that the AG adopted guidelines that meet the statutory procedures, the targeting and minimization procedures and guidelines do
not violate the Fourth Amendment, and that a significant purpose of the programmatic collection is to obtain FII. 149
Finally, and importantly, the 2017 Amendments require the release of
information on the breakdown of U.S. and non-USPER targets of electronic
surveillance. The FBI must also disclose to the public the number of instances it opened “an investigation of a [USPER] (who is not considered a
threat to national security) based wholly or in part on an acquisition” of the
information under Section 702. 150 The DNI and AG must annually release a
declassified version of the minimization procedures that apply to the handling
of USPER information collected under Section 702. 151 The AG must also
report the number of subjects targeted either under an order or under an emergency authorization, and the number of those targeted who are USPERs. 152
This report must be unclassified “to the extent consistent with national security” and publicly available. 153 Section 702 surveillance is subject to regular
review by the Justice Department, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (“ODNI”), Congress, and FISC. 154 NSA employees also receive
extensive training on Section 702 to minimize abuses. 155
To summarize, the Section 702 program is highly valuable but also
highly constrained and monitored. The Fourth Amendment is a fundamental
limitation on collections of USPERs’ data, whether intentional or incidental.
In particular, the warrant requirement, minimization procedures, and reporting requirements that promote transparency—as adopted at various levels
147. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g) (2012).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 2017 Amendments, supra note 7137, at sec 102, 132 Stat. at 9.
151. Id. at sec. 104, 132 Stat. 13.
152. Id. at sec. 102, 132 Stat. 9. According to the DOJ, during 2018, the government filed 1081
applications for authority to conduct electronic surveillance. Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to The Honorable James
C. Duff, Director, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, (May 3, 2019) (on file with authors). The
FISC approved 1079 applications. According to the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, which reports the number of proposed applications, the government filed 1142 applications
and 830 were granted, 245 were modified, 40 were denied in part, and 27 were denied in full. The
total number of persons targeted for electronic surveillance was between 1500 and 1999 and the
aggregate number of USPERs targeted was between 0 and 499. Id.
153. 2017 Amendments, supra note 7137, at sec. 107, 132 Stat. at 14.
154. CHRIS INGLIS & JEFF KOSSEFF, IN DEFENSE OF FAA SECTION 702, 15–19 (2016),
www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/ingliskosseff_defenseof702_final_v3_digital.pdf.
155. Id. at 16–17.
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throughout FISA—protect civil liberties, including the First Amendment.
Again, these provisions could serve as a model for creating legislation that
would allow surveillance to combat disinformation campaigns designed to
influence the electoral process. Similar warrant requirements, minimization
procedures, and reporting requirements would protect Fourth and First
Amendment rights.
III. FISA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Surveillance will always implicate the First Amendment because of its
potential to create a chilling effect on speech or impose associational burdens.
FISA surveillance, in particular, has faced many First Amendment challenges, and Congress has reformed it to assuage these concerns. 156 Generally,
if a warrant names accounts of foreign powers or agents disseminating or
engaging in disinformation, a FISC may authorize the collection of their communications metadata. 157 That the government can intercept communications of foreign nationals believed to be outside the United States buttresses
this point. 158 For example, an acquisition order could, in theory, seek all telephone and e-mail communications to and from countries of foreign policy
interest, like Russia. That could include communications to and from
USPERs.
However, if the government is surveilling for Russian disinformation,
critics might raise concerns that the government could pretextually target a
USPER for an expressed political view that aligns with disinformation tactics. Thus, a person may be chilled from stating their actual beliefs for fear
of government intervention. 159 This section analyzes how FISA and the debate surrounding it can provide lessons learned for legislation to combat information warfare.
A. First Amendment Rights
Generally, to justify interference with First Amendment rights, the government must have a compelling state interest, narrowly tailored to achieve

156. See, e.g., United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that surveillance of U.S. citizens engaged in terrorist activities does not violate the First Amendment);
United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), judgment aff’d without opinion, 729
F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Aldawsari, 740 F.3d 1015 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendant was an agent of a foreign power
and electronic surveillance was legal). But see United States v. Missick, 875 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir.
1989) (finding that the defendant was not an agent of a foreign power such that FISA would apply).
158. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).
159. Cf. Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295,
299–300 (2002).
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its stated purpose. Some have questioned whether combatting efforts designed to undermine the electoral process is a clear enough national security
interest to justify infringing on USPERs’ First Amendment rights. 160 As the
Keith Court stated, freedom of speech is placed in danger “where the
[g]overnment attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect
‘domestic security.’” 161 Justifying surveillance on a so-called “national security interest” would be similarly vague without careful elaboration.
B. The Success of First Amendment Claims Under FISA
It is hard for an individual to make a successful claim that surveillance
authorized by FISA violated their First Amendment rights. High potential
for the abuse of First Amendment rights may exist when the executive branch
alone makes national security surveillance decisions. 162 The FISC tends to
reject any First Amendment objections or fails to mention them. 163 Arguments raised in other federal courts that challenge surveillance programs under the First Amendment also tend to fail. 164
First, where surveillance, under FISA, does not directly target a USPER,
courts have held that USPERs have no legal claim or concern under the First
Amendment caveat, which prohibits probable cause determinations from being made solely on a proposed target’s First Amendment activities, 165 as the
First Amendment caveat does not apply to non-USPERs. 166 In ACLU Foundation of Southern California v. Barr, 167 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed a district court order upholding the legality of surveillance of nonresident aliens (non-USPERs), except for the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. 168 According
to the court, only two of the eight alien plaintiffs were permanent resident
aliens that would qualify as USPERs. 169 Thus, the First Amendment caveat

160. See Goldenziel & Cheema, supra note 8, at 95–96.
161. 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
162. Thistle, supra note 51, at 1218.
163. See, e.g., [Redacted], No. PR/TT [Redacted], at 66–69 (FISA Ct. [Redacted]) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), https://www.odni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf (holding that
NSA bulk collection of email and Internet metadata under Section 214 of the Patriot Act did not
violate the First Amendment).
164. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015) (deciding the cases
without reaching the First Amendment issue); United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI1, 2014 WL 2866749, at *30–32 (D. Or. June 24, 2014) (holding that surveillance under Section
702 of FISA did not violate the First Amendment since the Fourth Amendment was satisfied).
165. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (2012).
166. United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (asserting no USPER was
the target of the surveillance pursuant to FISA, the First Amendment caveat was not implicated).
167. 952 F.2d 457, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 464.
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only applied to those two plaintiffs. 170 However, the court noted “the government may be violating the First Amendment when it investigates someone
because it dislikes the person’s political views,” 171 and because the First
Amendment does apply to non-resident aliens to some extent, that may be a
basis for constitutional concern regarding all the plaintiffs, including nonUSPERs. 172 Thus, if the target of the surveillance is a USPER or the target’s
activities are protected by the First Amendment, a wiretap will violate FISA
if the target is labeled as a foreign power based solely on the target’s First
Amendment activities. 173
Second, the government is allowed to rely in part on First Amendment
activities in its application requesting surveillance, and the FISC is allowed
to rely in part on First Amendment activities in permitting surveillance. In
United States v. Rahim, 174 the defendant argued that “the FISA evidence was
obtained solely on the basis of his protected First Amendment activities.” 175
The court looked to precedent from other districts 176 to determine that “while
Rahim may have been engaged in some protected First Amendment activities, these activities were not the sole basis underlying that determination.” 177
Because the FISC judge could find probable cause that the target of the surveillance was an agent of a foreign power through considering other nonspeech or association activities, the court found Rahim’s argument to be meritless. 178 Extending Rahim, in United States v. Kokayi, 179 the court found that
a target’s First Amendment activities may contribute to a probable cause determination if the target engaged in otherwise prohibited activities. In Kokayi, the defendants alleged that “the FISA applications may have been improperly predicated on protected First Amendment activities.” 180 The court,
however, disagreed. 181 Instead, it asserted, “the probable cause determina-

170. Id. (“Although one would hardly know it from the Complaint, § 1805(a)(3)(A) turns out to
be irrelevant to twenty-two of the twenty-four plaintiffs in this case.”).
171. Id. at 471.
172. Id. at 467.
173. See United States v. Sattar, No. 02 CR. 395 JGK, 2003 WL 22137012, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 15, 2003).
174. No. 3:17-CR-0169-B, 2019 WL 1595682, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2019).
175. Id. at *1–3.
176. United States v. Aziz, 228 F. Supp. 3d 363, 377 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (upholding FISA applications “grounded in conduct which plainly exceeds the bounds of the First Amendment’s protective
sphere”); United States v. Elshinawy, No. ELH-16-0009, 2017 WL 1048210, at *11 (D. Md. Mar.
20, 2017) (noting the government can use statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy to show
a participant’s criminal intent); United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548–49 (E.D. Va.
2006) (noting the court can rely in part on First Amendment activities).
177. Rahim, 2019 WL 1595682, at *2.
178. Id.
179. 1:18-cr-410 (LMB), 2019 WL 1186846, at *1 (E.D. Va. March 13, 2019).
180. Id. at *4.
181. Id.
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tion may rely in part on activities protected by the First Amendment, provided the determination also relies on activities not protected by the First
Amendment.” 182 Thus, a court may consider an individual’s protected First
Amendment activities so long as additional evidence of prohibited activities
exists. 183
Finally, First Amendment claims often fail under FISA because defendants do not always allege a proper First Amendment violation, such as a
chilling effect. For the First Amendment to invalidate a practice, the government’s action must harm a person because of their protected speech. 184 The
mere assertion that speech or association will potentially be chilled is not
sufficient to support a First Amendment claim. 185 An unconstitutional
chilling effect exists where the government’s actions are “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature.” 186 Three cases, Laird v. Tatum, 187 Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 188 and United States v. Falvey, 189 provide
the parameters of success for chilling effect claims under FISA. Because
FISA forces the government to meet specific standards before an order based
on an individual’s First Amendment activities can be issued, courts have yet
to find FISA’s provisions so overly broad that they chill an individual’s First
Amendment rights. 190
In Laird v. Tatum, the Court found the plaintiff’s claim non-justiciable
as the “allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a
claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future
harm.” 191 The plaintiffs did not present evidence of illegal surveillance practices. 192 Similarly, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Court denied standing to plaintiffs who alleged actual and threatened harm from surveillance conducted under Section 702. 193 However, the plaintiffs did not
show a realistic threat of imminent injury. 194 Under Section 702, the govern-

182. Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548 (E.D. Va. 2006)).
183. Id. at *13–14.
184. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
185. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971).
186. Laird, 408 U.S. at 11.
187. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
188. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
189. 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
190. See id. at 1313 (asserting that because the judge, not the executive branch, makes the finding that the target is truly an agent of a foreign power, and that FISA admonishes that no USPER
can be considered an agent solely based on her First Amendment activities, FISA is not overbroad);
see also ACLU Found. of So. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
191. Laird, 408 U.S. at 13–14.
192. Id.
193. 568 U.S. at 402.
194. Id. at 405–22.
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ment can monitor foreign communications without a showing of individualized suspicion, even if that program incidentally collects communications of
USPERs. 195
In United States v. Falvey, the defendants, accused of supporting the
Irish Republican Army (“IRA”), claimed FISA violated the First Amendment
by allowing the government to engage in politically motivated surveillance. 196 Further, the defendants asserted that surveillance would create a
chilling effect where people would be afraid to express their sympathies for
certain groups because the government would then invade their privacy under
FISA. 197 However, the court held that FISA, on its face, is neither overbroad
nor unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, as it did not create a
chilling effect. 198 The Court found it important that the FISC—and not the
executive branch—made the finding that a target is an agent of a foreign
power. The Court reasoned that a judicial determination, rather than an executive one, protects against abusive political surveillance. 199 Further, the
Court noted that FISA prevents the executive from determining that someone
is an agent of a foreign power solely based on protected First Amendment
activities. 200 The court went on to assert that the First Amendment does not
protect the IRA’s acts of intimidating and coercing the civilian population
and government, but more importantly, that these actions are “legitimately
encompassed by FISA.” 201 Accordingly, “the defendants’ First Amendment
rights were not violated.” 202
To summarize, plaintiffs must assert an actual chilling effect on their
speech, not a potential one, to claim a First Amendment violation under
FISA. This requirement by courts is consistent with the longstanding principle of actual harm required for standing. No First Amendment challenge to
FISA has yet succeeded. However, a plaintiff alleging injury-in-fact to her
constitutional rights due to FISA may very well succeed. To preserve constitutional liberties, any legislation allowing surveillance to combat information warfare should similarly allow lawsuits to challenge it based on injury-in-fact.
C. The Link Between the First and Fourth Amendment
A remaining question is whether FISA-like protections embedded in the
legislation enabling surveillance to combat disinformation campaigns would
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a)–(b) (2012).
540 F. Supp. 1306, 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1314–15.
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Id. at 1315; see also United States v. Aziz, 228 F. Supp. 3d 363 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1315 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(2)).
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be sufficient to address First Amendment concerns. Courts will likely hold
that Fourth Amendment protections are adequate to protect First Amendment
rights, as they have determined with regard to FISA. 203 However, we argue
that Fourth Amendment protections are insufficient to protect the First
Amendment rights implicated in any surveillance necessary to combat disinformation campaigns.
The First and Fourth Amendments both play an essential role in protecting the civil liberties of USPERs. Courts generally evaluate surveillance under the Fourth Amendment, not the First Amendment. 204 As a result, courts
have found repeatedly that the satisfaction of Fourth Amendment requirements is sufficient to protect First Amendment rights in surveillance cases. 205
For example, in the 1978 case of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 206 the Supreme
Court held that procedural safeguards are unnecessary to protect First
Amendment Rights in the context of search and seizure as long as Fourth
Amendment requirements are satisfied. 207 In Zurcher, a student newspaper
alleged that a police search violated its First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the warrant’s scope was overly broad and the publication
should not have been subject to a third-party search. 208 Officers searched the
newspaper’s office to retrieve photos it published about a violent protest in
which none of the newspaper’s members were involved. 209 The Court found
that “[n]either the Fourth Amendment nor the cases requiring consideration
of First Amendment values in issuing search warrants, however, call for imposing the regime ordered by the [d]istrict [c]ourt.”210 It held that First
Amendment rights are protected where searches are subjected to a test of reasonableness and a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. 211 Thus, according
to the Court, where government action meets the Fourth Amendment requirements, an individual’s First Amendment rights are adequately protected, and
no further safeguards are needed. 212

203. See, e.g., United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
85452, at *38 (D. Or. June 24, 2014).
204. Nicole B. Casarez, The Synergy of Privacy and Speech, 18 U. P A. J. CONST. L. 813, 817
(2016).
205. ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 688 (6th Cir. 2007) (Smith Gibbons, J., concurring) (noting
that the plaintiffs did not have standing to allege a complaint under the First Amendment); see also
Gordon v. Warren Consol. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 778, 781 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding surveillance,
which falls under the Fourth Amendment “does not violate First Amendment rights, even though it
may be directed at communicative or associative activities”).
206. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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208. Id. at 551–52.
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Surveillance to combat disinformation campaigns, however, is fundamentally different from a physical search of a newspaper’s offices. First
Amendment rights will be chilled if Americans believe their government can
obtain a warrant to surveil their communications based only on probable
cause. If the government can obtain a warrant based on such a low standard,
Americans will likely believe that the government will do so frequently. This
belief would make Americans more likely to self-censor their communications and to protest government actions. The outcry after the surfacing of the
National Security Agency’s haystack program illustrates this point. 213 If
Americans strongly opposed the idea of the National Security Agency collecting their metadata in a haystack, then they would protest the concept of
the government’s ability to easily surveil their online communications. Because of the high potential for chilling of speech, expression, and association,
legislation regarding surveillance to combat disinformation campaigns must
include additional protections for First Amendment rights. Courts must decouple the First Amendment analysis from the Fourth Amendment analysis,
and legislation must create additional safeguards for the First Amendment
itself in this context.
1. The Warrant Requirement
The government can meet both Fourth Amendment and First Amendment requirements by obtaining a warrant to conduct surveillance to combat
disinformation campaigns. To do so, the government would follow requirements similar to those outlined in FISA. Obtaining a warrant is the easiest
way for the government to show that it has a compelling state interest in conducting the requested surveillance and that the means of achieving that interest are narrowly tailored. A warrant request would require the government
to state the target of the surveillance and provide evidence of a reasonable
belief that the target presents a threat to national security. 214 Thus, by complying with FISA-like procedures—allowing prior judicial review of surveillance for reasonableness and minimization procedures—the government will
not violate the First Amendment. 215 Prior judicial adjudication is exactly
what the Supreme Court contemplated as adequate First Amendment protection: applying the Fourth Amendment with “scrupulous exactitude.” 216 FISA

213. See, e.g., John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Secret Without Reason and Costly Without
Accomplishment: Questioning the National Security Agency’s Metadata Program, 10 I/S: J.L. &
POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 407, 409 (2014) (discussing the secrecy, effectiveness, and “civil liberties and
privacy implications of the NSA’s massive surveillance efforts”).
214. Thistle, supra note 51, at 1227.
215. Id. at 1226.
216. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); see also A Quantity of Copies of Books
v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 208 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731–32, 738 (1961).
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provides a model for new domestic surveillance laws that would require similarly stringent application of Fourth Amendment requirements. 217 The procedures and protections outlined in FISA are not sufficient, however. Legislation combatting disinformation should require additional safeguards given
the First Amendment interests at stake.
2. Imposing New Warrant Requirements
While Section 702 of FISA currently does not require a warrant for each
collection in bulk data collections, especially for incidental collections, a
modified warrant process for bulk data collections to combat information
warfare would mitigate some of the criticism of Section 702 and better protect constitutional rights. 218
Section 702 of FISA has been criticized in the courts. In United States
v. Mohamud, 219 the defendant, a USPER, argued that Section 702 violated
the First and Fourth Amendment. 220 The defendant’s “communications were
collected incidentally during intelligence collection targeted at” nonUSPERs outside the United States. 221 The defendant specifically challenged
the breadth and vagueness of Section 702 surveillance, asserting it “chill[ed]
Americans’ exercise of their First Amendment rights, causing many to
change their habits in using the Internet and telephones.” 222 The Ninth Circuit held, however, that the “district court correctly rejected [the defendant’s]
First Amendment challenge, as motions to suppress based on First Amendment violations are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.” 223 Though the
Ninth Circuit used the Fourth Amendment to analyze the alleged violation, it
applied the “scrupulous exactitude” standards as ordained for First Amendment concerns that arise in Fourth Amendment searches and surveillance. 224
To be precise, the Oregon federal district court judge held that Section 702
FISA surveillance does not trigger the Warrant Clause because of prior case

217. See supra notes 112–116 and accompanying text (discussing the protections for civil liberties within § 702).
218. 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2012).
219. 843 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 2016).
220. Id. at 431.
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*38 (D. Or. June 24, 2014) (emphasis added).
222. Id. at *30.
223. Mohamud, 843 F.3d at 444 n.28; see Mohamud, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85452, at *31; see
also United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 747–48 (9th Cir. 2007).
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law on foreign intelligence gathering. 225 In the alternative, even if the Warrant Clause is triggered, Section 702 falls within the foreign intelligence exception. 226
The analysis used in Mohamud is illuminating and provides lessons for
new legislation to combat information warfare. First, the defendant in Mohamud contended that “the reasoning in Keith applies equally well to foreign
national security surveillance, especially because of the First Amendment implications in the seizure of phone calls and emails.” 227 However, the Supreme
Court stated that a special needs exception to the warrant requirement exists
where, “beyond the normal need for law enforcement, . . . the warrant and
probable-cause requirement [become] impracticable.” 228 Among other Circuits, the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits recognized a foreign intelligence exception on the basis that “the important national interest in foreign
intelligence gathering justifies electronic surveillance without prior judicial
review.” 229 The FISC also held that the foreign intelligence exception applies
to Section 702 surveillance. 230 With this background, the Oregon federal district court in Mohamud concluded that in “balanc[ing] the intrusion on the
individual’s interest in privacy, namely the incidental collection of
[USPERs’] communications, against these special needs when the government targets a non-[USPER] believed to be outside the United States . . . the
foreign intelligence exception applies and no warrant is required.” 231
After finding that the foreign intelligence exception applies to Section
702, the Mohamud court turned to whether the government action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 232 The district court applied a totality of
the circumstances test, 233 weighing “the promotion of legitimate governmental interests against the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.” 234 The court did “not find the lack of procedures associated with warrants ma[d]e [Section] 702 searches unreasonable under the
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Fourth Amendment.” 235 Rather, “the minimization procedures contribute to
the reasonableness of [Section] 702 under the Fourth Amendment.” 236
Thus, the Mohamud court went through a two-step process in determining that FISA adequately protects First Amendment concerns by considering
those concerns through a Fourth Amendment framework. That is the court
found, first, the foreign intelligence exception applies to FISA Section 702, 237
and, second, the government’s action under that exception was reasonable. 238
However, bulk collection without a warrant leaves First Amendment
values vulnerable. 239 Fourth Amendment protections are weakened where no
warrant is required. 240 Without these Fourth Amendment safeguards, a separate First Amendment analysis becomes crucial to protect freedoms of
speech, expression, and association. 241 Any legislation to combat information warfare should incorporate such an analysis.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM FISA
FISA’s particular First Amendment protections for USPERs can be a
useful model for allowing the United States to surveil foreign agents without
unduly infringing on the civil liberties of USPERs. In particular, the statutory
protections within FISA can, with some tailoring, properly address concerns
about surveillance and potential intrusion on USPERs’ privacy, especially
those engaging in disinformation campaigns intended to undermine the electoral process. Legislation should draw upon critiques of FISA to improve
protections for constitutional liberties when developing programs or collecting information to combat information warfare.
At the outset, to protect the First Amendment, Congress should require
procedures similar to FISA’s if open-source information is unavailing. New
legislation should maintain FISA’s high standards for allowing the collection
of information on USPERs. First, the government must obtain a court order
or warrant. Probable cause must not be based solely on a proposed target’s
First Amendment activities. 242 Second, the government must adopt and follow minimization procedures to prevent misuse and retention of any
USPERs’ data that they have incidentally collected. 243 New legislation that
relaxes surveillance restrictions on USPERs for the specific national security
purpose of combatting information warfare must have regular and rigorous
235.
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oversight by the Department of Justice, Congress, and the FISC, much like
the oversight structure for FISA Section 702.
In addition, case law involving FISA, discussed above, suggests further
safeguards that Congress should incorporate into future legislation. The surveillance required to combat disinformation campaigns may meet the foreign
intelligence exception but cannot rely on it entirely. Any legislation to combat information warfare through domestic surveillance should also contain a
warrant requirement as additional protection for First Amendment rights.
While the Fourth Amendment is necessary to protect First Amendment
rights, 244 compliance with the procedural requirements of the Fourth Amendment is insufficient to protect First Amendment expressive and associational
rights of individuals subject to surveillance. The First Amendment inquiry
should thus be conducted separately from any Fourth Amendment requirements. Because of the high potential for violation of First Amendment rights
and a chilling effect on speech, the government should be required to put
forward a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored to surveil a particular individual as to justify any intrusion on First Amendment rights. An
all-encompassing interest in national security would be too broad. The government should be required to articulate a specific national security interest
that would require surveillance of a particular individual. This would help
avoid over-surveillance of Americans at large.
A warrant is the simplest way for the government to show that it has a
compelling state interest that would justify infringement on a First Amendment right and that its proposed surveillance is narrowly tailored. 245 The
government can then allow a court to decide whether surveillance is reasonable and whether the government has met FISA’s requirements or other criteria. A warrant would satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement and provide additional protections for First Amendment activity as well.
Some might argue that obtaining a warrant would be too burdensome
and restrictive on surveillance. However, where First Amendment interests,
as here, are incredibly implicated, requiring this level of judicial oversight is
necessary for five reasons. First, as with FISA, the government should be
able to surveil for urgent national security purposes so long as it obtains an
application for a warrant within seven days. In this case, the government
should follow minimization procedures to protect First Amendment rights.
The government should still make a showing of a compelling state interest to
conduct such surveillance that is narrowly tailored to achieve the specific national security objective. The government would ideally present this showing
before a committee or a special branch of the FISC that could provide expedited review. 246
244. See supra Section III.C.
245. See supra Section III.C.1.
246. See Thistle, supra note 51, at 1203.
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Second, the analysis in Keith contemplates the balance between the government’s interest in national security and the privacy interests of
USPERs. 247 The court in Keith held that a neutral magistrate should issue a
warrant instead of giving the executive branch sole discretion over domestic
surveillance. 248 Similar competing interests must be balanced when justifying foreign surveillance. 249 Since the fight against enemy information warfare will require both domestic and foreign surveillance, a warrant is necessary to protect the Fourth and First Amendment rights of USPERs in either
case.
Third, USPERs’ First Amendment data should only be accessible for
this specific national security purpose of fighting information warfare under
this framework. 250 Only particular agencies, such as Homeland Security,
State, and Justice, should be able to collect USPERs’ information, and legislation must create a specified process for the steps an agency must take to
access that information. This process would be similar to the certification
process agencies currently undertake to obtain FISA orders. 251
Fourth, courts should emphasize minimization procedures that prioritize
discarding and/or redacting USPER information except where “such person’s
identity is necessary to understand” the information campaign. 252 This information, like upstream information, should be tagged, so agencies are alerted
of its sensitive, First Amendment nature. Further, the government should not
retain any information collected to assess and thwart information campaigns
designed to influence the electoral process beyond the electoral cycle at hand.
After the electoral cycle is over, agencies may summarize their findings, but
all USPERs’ data should be deleted or discarded within the shortest time possible, unless the agency can make a clear showing in a judicial body that it or
another agency requires the data for an ongoing national security investigation. 253
Finally, to improve transparency and oversight, private companies
should be permitted to disclose the number and type of government requests
they receive. The government should also report annually how it queries and
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uses USPERs’ communications. Congress and the courts must not abdicate
their responsibility for providing oversight over electronic surveillance programs. As the ease of surveillance grows and its use becomes more prevalent, safeguarding constitutional liberties becomes increasingly essential.
V. CONCLUSION
In the fight against foreign information operations, the United States
must reform its laws to ensure the integrity of the electoral process, while at
the same time protecting civil liberties. The current framework and protections of FISA are a product of several rounds of congressional amendment
and national debate about how to balance critical national security interests
and civil liberties. While imperfect, FISA is a suitable reference and starting
point for the development of any legislation countering information campaigns: the warrant requirement, minimization procedures, certification process, and transparency-creating measures all should characterize that legislation in order to protect civil liberties. The United States must combat
information warfare that challenges the foundations of American democracy.
However, this fight cannot compromise the constitutional rights of USPERs.

